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“If you are engaged in a battle, violent or peaceful, you must first of all define who the enemy is, 
who the friend is, and why you characterize them as such.”  
– President Yoweri Museveni, “Sowing the Mustard Seed” 
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Introduction 
 The attacks of September 11
th
, 2001 ushered in a new era of international security 
priorities. Though mitigating the specter of terrorism had long been identified as a necessary task 
for most nations across the globe, the post-9/11 environment abruptly rendered counterterrorism 
more salient than ever before. On September 18
th
, the Bush Administration enacted the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force, establishing the legal justification necessary for 
American forces to conduct strikes that would “prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States.”1 In an oft-quoted speech, President Bush vowed to conduct these 
operations in any nation associated with terrorism, and leveraged cooperation with an assertion 
that members of the international community were “either… with [the United States] … or … 
with the terrorists.”2 Similar pressure was applied by international organizations such as the 
United Nations, within which the Security Council rapidly passed a resolution that bound all 
member states to meet explicit counterterrorism obligations.
3
 
 These events began to normalize the perception that the international community had to 
pick sides in a “war of ideas”4 that pitted “civilization … [against] those who would destroy it.”5 
The dichotomy was clear: those who worked with the United States in countering terrorism 
would be viewed as legitimate actors, while those who did not risked becoming international 
pariahs. Predictably, states responded with condemnations of those who commit acts of terrorism 
on a near-universal basis. However, just who and what qualified to be labeled as a terrorist and 
terrorism remains fiercely contested. This lack of definitional consensus incentivizes calculating 
                                                 
1
 S.J.Res. 23 (107
th
): Authorization for Use of Military Force 
2
 Transcript of President Bush’s address, CNN, September 20, 2001, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/ 
3
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), S/RES/1373 
4
 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p. 23 
5
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regimes to appropriate the rhetoric of counterterrorism and to couch enduring, localized security 
issues within it. The result is a convenient rhetorical façade – one that enables the security 
apparatus of a given state to justify action taken against perceived threats to the government, be 
they rival political parties, groups of non-state actors, critical journalists, or individual dissidents, 
under the guise of counterterrorism.   
This paper explores the motivations behind such rhetorical shifts and establishes the 
consequences that may result from an international mandate to combat that which is fluidly 
defined. The paper begins with an overview of the relevant academic literature on the power of 
definitions, rhetoric, and labels with a particular focus on how these concepts apply to terms such 
as terrorist and terrorism. Subsequently, a brief history of how these terms have been employed 
is provided in order to demonstrate that the meanings behind them have been subject to change. 
The paper then establishes the ongoing disparity in definitions suggested by members of 
academia, government, and the international community. A section on changing international 
legal conventions and norms with respect to terrorism follows, establishing a history of divergent 
compliance with such conventions despite widespread rhetorical support. In order to best 
understand the incentives behind the appropriation of these labels and definitions, the paper then 
employs a case study of rhetorical shifts by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and his 
administration over the duration of his nearly thirty year (and ongoing) tenure in office. A brief 
conclusion follows. 
 
The Power of a Name 
In a world full of complexity and uncertainty, labels serve as heuristics – valuable 
shortcuts that indicate the probable behaviors and characteristics of actors and objects that are 
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encountered by a given individual. Definitions provide the meaning behind these labels, 
delineating how and when it is appropriate to apply them and, implicitly, how and when it is not. 
These meanings arise through a communal discourse and, because the end result is in a sense 
negotiated, “the [definition] process is also to some extent competitive.”6 Upon such rhetorical 
battlegrounds, actors with disparate agendas are incentivized to “attain a victory of interpretation 
and ensure that [their] particular viewpoint triumphs.”7  
These rhetorical battlegrounds are particularly contentious regarding terrorism, a term 
with an unfavorable connotation. In contemporary interpretation, acts of terrorism are often 
presumed to fall outside of the established norms of warfare, employed by those dishonorable, 
cowardly, and despicable enough to deliberately target the innocent and most vulnerable. This is 
in stark contrast to the way in which conventional soldiers are typically viewed by the 
populations they serve: as honorable, brave, and deserving of a certain degree of reverence. 
Because such a dichotomy has been established, wherein terrorism is characterized as entirely 
antithetical to the norms not only of warfare but also of human behavior, those labeled as such 
will struggle to establish “legitimacy for their cause or sympathy for their actions.”8  
Acts of terrorism are, by nature, inherently communicative. Though the direct brunt of an 
attack may be shouldered by a crowd of civilians, important infrastructure, or an otherwise 
symbolically significant target, the primary goal is to incite a climate of widespread fear and to 
use it as leverage to influence an entire population and or its governing bodies.
9
 It is this 
additional communicative element, this “propaganda by the deed,” that differentiates terrorism 
                                                 
6
 Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism (2
nd
 Ed.), Joseph S. Tuman, p. 45 
7
 Fighting Words: Naming Terrorists, Bandits, Rebels and Other Violent Actors, Michael V. Bhatia, Third World 
Quarterly, 26(1), 2005, p. 7 
8
 Tuman, p. 57 
9
 On Terrorism Itself, Carl Wellman, Journal of Value Inquiry, 13(4), 1979 
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from conventional violence and crime.
10
 It is also, however, what makes those labeled as 
terrorists particularly vulnerable to being undermined rhetorically – if such individuals and 
groups can be characterized as illegitimate and morally reprehensible, their power to win over 
hearts and minds to a given cause can be curtailed. By extension, if governments can establish 
their foes as terrorists, they simultaneously legitimize their own applications of violence and 
recruit support for such action.
11
 As a result, states, groups, and individuals are all incentivized to 
jockey for the most advantageous definitions of terrorism in order to further their agendas.  
This discussion is not designed to condone terrorist attacks or obfuscate their heinous 
nature. Rather, it seeks to illustrate the power that can be channeled through rhetoric and labels. 
The battlespace of the war on terror extends beyond what is material and occurs in a rhetorical 
dimension as well, and the resultant understanding of what terrorism is and is not has real 
consequences. In order to explore this idea further, it is necessary to briefly trace the evolution of 
the of the term terrorist from its inception through to its contemporary application. 
 
Terrorism: An Abbreviated Etymology 
 The term terrorism originated in the late 18
th
 century during the French Revolution as 
Robespierre’s nascent Jacobin government purged thousands of fellow Frenchmen in a counter-
revolutionary strategy that the Jacobins themselves referred to as ‘The Terror’.12 As Jaggar notes, 
“it is worth remembering that the original case [of terrorism] was one of politically motivated 
violence carried out by a government against its own citizens.”13 Over the centuries that followed 
the application of the term underwent a number of shifts, often mirroring changes in terrorist 
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 What Is Terrorism, Why Is It Wrong, and Could It Ever Be Morally Permissible?, Alison M. Jaggar, Journal of 
Social Philosophy, 36(2), 2005, p. 206 
11
 Bhatia, p. 12 
12
 Tuman, pp. 4-6 
13
 Jaggar, p. 202 
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tactics, doctrine, and technological innovation.
14
 Despite its initial use as a term describing state-
sanctioned violence, terrorism underwent a reversal and was proudly adopted by 19
th
 century 
anarchist groups who conducted assassination campaigns that targeted influential members of 
government.
15
 One such anarchist, after wounding a Russian police commander, “[threw] her 
weapon to the floor … proclaim[ing] that she was a terrorist, not a killer.”16 The interpretation 
that terrorism could be condoned and even celebrated under certain circumstances was evidently 
quite compelling at the time, as the attacker was later acquitted in court for what was determined 
to be a justifiable action.
17
 Such an interpretation would prove to be short-lived.  
 After World War I, as defeated empires receded into the annals of history and new states 
emerged via the process of self-determination, dissident groups in still-colonized areas formed, 
targeting law enforcement and military members with the hope of inciting heavy-handed 
responses that would lend sympathy to their independence desires.
18
 It was during this period 
that the contemporary rhetorical struggle over the application of the terrorist label originated. 
Non-state actors adopted the freedom fighter identity that is now commonplace in the popular 
lexicon as they sought to further legitimize their independence movements and to avoid the 
growing negative connotation associated with terrorism.
19
 Similarly, governments began to 
realize the useful implications that resulted from branding opposition groups with the pejorative 
term terrorist.
20
 Though terrorist tactics and targets would continue to develop in subsequent 
years, the rhetorical strategies that emerged during this era remain a constant to this day.  
                                                 
14
 The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11, David C. Rapoport, Anthropoetics, 8(1), 2002, p. 3 
15
 Ibid  
16
 Ibid, (author quoting Adam B. Ulam, In the Name of the People (1977), p. 269) 
17
 The Intellectual Origins of Modern Terrorism in Europe, Martin A. Miller, p. 42 
18
 Rapoport, p.5 
19
 Ibid  
20
 Ibid 
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 The anti-colonialist wave was followed by Vietnam-era ‘New Left’ terror groups who 
gained notoriety on the world stage for utilizing daring and highly visible tactics that included 
strikes on foreign embassies, the kidnapping of prominent businessmen and diplomats, and the 
hijacking of airliners, thus catalyzing the increased use of the term international terrorism.
21
 
Often radically nationalist in nature, third wave groups moved from simply targeting members of 
the state apparatus to deliberately targeting any member of society as a whole.
22
 This 
indiscriminant approach marked the origin of what Miller calls “terrorism without boundaries,” a 
major tactical shift that has characterized most terrorist activity in the years since.
23
 Shortly 
thereafter, the fourth and final wave emerged. Generally associated with radical Islamist groups, 
fourth wave terrorism is distinguished by the salience of religious identity and its centrality in 
resultant conflicts.
24
 Bruce Hoffman argues that it was during this period that terrorism moved 
“from an individual phenomenon of subnational violence to … a wider pattern of non-state 
conflict.
25
 The increased targeting of American installations and forces during this wave, and 
ultimately the attacks of September 11
th
, 2001, would serve as the impetus for the War on Terror.  
 The evolution of the meaning behind the term terrorism and the resultant shifts in its 
application are evident. Though being labeled a terrorist in the 19
th
 century may have conferred a 
certain degree of legitimacy, it soon was transformed not only into a derisive term that was to be 
avoided if at all possible but also a rhetorical tool that could be used to delegitimize others. 
Indeed, many prominent terrorists and terror groups throughout history have sought to avoid the 
label, preferring instead terms with positive connotations that serve their own interests and 
agendas such as freedom fighter, guerrilla, liberation movement, or rebel. Perhaps the most 
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 Rapoport, p. 6 
22
 Rapoport, p. 5 
23
 Miller, p. 31 
24
 Rapoport, p.7  
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notorious terrorist in history, Osama bin Laden, resisted being labeled in a 2004 speech, arguing 
that the attacks of 9/11 were acts of self-defense and asking rhetorically: “… should a man be 
blamed for defending his sanctuary?”26 Prompted by the same treatment, Ali Ahmeti, the leader 
of the Macedonian-based National Liberation Army (NLA), replied that a “person cannot be a 
terrorist… who wears an army badge, who has an objective for which he is fighting, who 
respects the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Tribunal, who acts in public with name and 
surname, and answers for everything he does… who is aiming for good reforms and democracy 
in the country.”27 Ahmeti surely makes a more convincing case for his movement than bin 
Laden, and thus while some members of NATO were convinced that the NLA fit the bill for a 
terrorist organization, others pointed to their “restraint” as clear evidence that they were merely 
an insurgent group.
28
 In 2002, Chechen separatists seized a crowded theater in Moscow, 
capturing over 900 hostages and causing a stand-off with Russian authorities that would last for 
three days and ultimately result in the deaths of 130 people.
29
 A reporter with the British Sunday 
Times was able to enter the theater and interview the group’s leader, Movsar Barayev, who, in 
response to terrorist labeling, asserted that “we’d have asked for a plane and a million dollars if 
we were terrorists.”30 Here Barayev implied that the goals of his group, namely to end an 
ongoing Russian war in Chechnya,
31
 were more legitimate than those of the less principled 
groups who actually qualify to be labeled as terrorists. In a final and particularly illuminating set 
of examples, Tuman points to Nelson Mandela being labeled a terrorist by the South African 
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 Full transcript of bin Ladin’s speech, Al Jazeera, 2004, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/11/200849163336457223.html 
27
 Is There a Good Terrorist?, Timothy Garton Ash, 2001, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2001/nov/29/is-there-a-good-terrorist/ 
28
 Ibid 
29
 Moscow theatre siege: Questions remain unanswered, BBC News, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
20067384 
30
 Terror In Moscow, CBS News, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/terror-in-moscow/ 
31
 Chechen gunmen storm Moscow theater, The Guardian, 2002, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/24/russia.chechnya 
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government for his involvement with the African National Congress; Menachem Begin’s 
involvement with the Jewish Irgun group that led to his branding as a terrorist by the British; and 
Yasser Arafat’s characterization as a terrorist by Israel for his position in the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization.
32
 All three men would go on to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize as 
public opinion shifted over the years that followed, illustrating just how interchangeable labels 
can be under certain circumstances.
33
    
 Indeed, across time and space groups with disparate agendas can be observed resisting 
labels that threaten to delegitimize and undermine their goals and reputation. In contrast, 
governments are incentivized to apply these labels liberally. Much of this rhetorical tug-of-war 
unfolds within media outlets that must choose which labels to use carefully. In the pursuit of 
objective reporting, some outlets like Reuters, for example, refrain from using the terms terrorist 
or terrorism whatsoever with the exception of direct quotations, preferring instead to “aim for a 
dispassionate use of language so that individuals, organizations and governments can make their 
own judgment on the basis of facts.”34 Similarly, the BBC suggests that “the word ‘terrorist’ 
itself can be a barrier rather than an aid to understanding,” and official policy is to avoid 
employing it if possible.
35
 But the result can sometimes be just as confusing: a study of media 
coverage during the 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis in Russia found the usage of as many as 
twenty different terms to describe the perpetrators, ranging from criminals and rebels to 
separatists and even activists.
36
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 Tuman, pp. 15-16 
33
 Ibid 
34
 Reuters Handbook of Journalism, The Reuters Style Guide, http://handbook.reuters.com/?title=T#terrorism  
35
 Terrorism: Language when Reporting Terrorism, BBC Editorial Guidelines, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/editorialguidelines/page/guidance-reporting-terrorism-full 
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 They’re Terrorists – Not Activists, Daniel Pipes, 2004 
11 
 
 The decision of some media outlets to refrain from the use of these terms is indicative of 
the strongly unfavorable connotations they evoke. Though terrorist groups and their tactics have 
evolved throughout history, our visceral reaction to those labeled as such generally has not. 
Despite such firm entrenchment in the popular lexicon, just what actions actually constitute 
terrorism remains a contentious debate amongst those in academia, government, and 
international organizations, and the prospect of a universally agreed upon definition of terrorism 
continues to be fleeting. The following explores a sampling of these definitional efforts to 
establish some points of contention. 
 
Contemporary Definitions  
 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary provides a rather simplistic definition and thus a useful 
starting point for discussion: 
Terrorism: the use of violent acts to frighten the people in an area as a way of trying to 
achieve a political goal.
37
 
This definition contains a number of the most common factors present in most terrorism 
definitions, including a use of violence, an ulterior goal of intimidation, and the presence of an 
underlying political motive. However, those in academia have identified numerous other factors 
that must be taken into account, and in so doing have proposed hundreds of alternative 
definitions that range along a minimalist to maximalist spectrum.
38
  
Academic Definitions 
Those in academia have struggled to identify a definition that pleases everyone. Indeed, the 
simplest definitions are often unable to address much of the nuance that has sparked the debate, 
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 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terrorism 
38
 The Definition of Terrorism, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, Alex P. Schmid, p. 39 
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while the most nuanced encounter the opposite problem and become too unwieldy, limiting their 
practical application. Schmid notes the widespread pessimism with which some academics 
approach the task: Walter Laqueur claimed that the debate would “lead to endless controversies”; 
Brian Jenkins calls it the “Bermuda Triangle of terrorism”; and J.V. Witbeck asserts sardonically 
that terrorism may be as simple as “violence I don’t support.”39 Perhaps the best explanation 
behind the difficulties comes from Jeffrey Simon, who suggests that the task is like describing in 
black and white a phenomenon that is inexorably grey.
40
  
Nevertheless, many attempts to define terrorism are useful. Reilly provides a particularly 
minimalist example: 
Terrorism is the use of intentional violence against non-combatants for political ends.
 41
 
While Reilly identifies the use of violence, the victimization of non-combatants, and an ultimate 
political motive, the definition does not take into account other potential motivations (e.g. 
religious or social) or targets (e.g. infrastructure, symbols). The definition also neglects to 
address the element of coercion. Richardson’s definition is a bit more nuanced: 
 Terrorism is politically motivated violence directed against non-combatant or symbolic  
 targets which is designed to communicate a message to a broader audience. The critical  
 feature of terrorism is the deliberate targeting of innocents in an effort to convey a 
 message to another party
42
. 
Richardson brings in an element not seen in a majority of definitions – the potential for terrorist 
acts to deliberately strike symbolic targets rather than simply non-combatants or civilians. The 
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 Ibid, p. 42 
40
 Ibid, p. 44 
41
 Ibid, p. 133 (quoting Reilly, 1994)  
42
 Ibid, p. 137 (quoting Richardson, 1999) 
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definition also makes it explicitly clear that the attack is designed to convey a message. Alison 
Jaggar proposes the following: 
Terrorism is the use of extreme threats or violence designed to intimidate or subjugate 
governments, groups, or individuals. It is a tactic of coercion intended to promote further 
ends that in themselves may be good, bad or indifferent. Terrorism may be practiced by 
governments or international bodies or forces, sub-state groups or even individuals. Its 
threats or violence are aimed directly or immediately at the bodies or belongings of 
innocent civilians but these are typically terrorists’ secondary targets; the primary 
targets of terrorists are the governments, groups or individuals that they wish to 
intimidate.
43
 
This definition is among the most inclusive proposed, and casts a wide net over the many forms 
in which terrorism may manifest itself. Jaggar includes stipulations that are standard in most 
definitions, noting an overall goal of intimidation or subjugation and the targeting of innocent 
civilians, but also goes so far as to suggest that an act of terror may be the means to a good end, 
and acknowledges the possibility of top-down, state-sponsored terror as well. Bruce Hoffman, 
after detailing the difficulties of defining terrorism, proposes another maximalist definition: 
 The deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence 
 in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of  
 violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects  
 beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear 
 within, and thereby intimidate, a wider ‘target audience’ that might include a rival ethnic 
 or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public 
 opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to  
                                                 
43
 Jaggar, p. 209 
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 consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their 
 violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack 
 to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.
44
  
Hoffman interestingly leaves out the common assertion that the victims must be civilians or 
noncombatants. Perhaps this is to take into account Kapitan’s perspective, which suggests that 
“political violence is often committed by those who act from outrage over perceived injustices 
and who do not think their targets to be ‘innocent’ of these injustices.”45 Although the sample 
size included here is small, it is clear that those in academia vary widely in their interpretation of 
terrorism.  
United States Government Definitions 
So too do the definitions vary across agencies of the United States government. Hoffman 
argues that this variance is the result of differences in the agency’s missions.46 The Department 
of State defines terrorism as: 
 Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets  
 by subnational groups or clandestine agents.
47
 
Surveyed on what they did not like about the Department of State’s definition, some academics 
argued that terrorism could be motivated by more than just politics, including religion, a specific 
issue, or a host of other reasons; that it does not include the intimidation or coercion aspect; and 
that it does not take into account that threats of terrorism can be just as effective as actual 
violence.
48
 In addition, it only references subnational groups or clandestine agents, leaving out 
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 The Terrorism of ‘Terrorism’, Tomis Kapitan, In James Sterba, ed., Terrorism and International Justice (Oxford, 
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the possibility that states themselves can commit terrorism. Another government entity, The 
Department of Defense, defines terrorism as: 
 The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, 
 or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit 
 of goals that are usually political.
49
 
This definition corrects some of the criticisms fielded regarding the Department of State’s 
attempt: there is a mention of the threat of violence, it takes into account motivations other than 
ones that are political, and it includes the coercive element. It entirely avoids the issue of 
delineating whether states, groups, or individuals can commit acts of terror. The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation utilizes definitions found in U.S. Code, which states that acts of international 
terrorism must meet three criteria: 
(1) Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law; 
(2) Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the 
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and 
(3) Occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., or transcend national 
boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they 
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators 
operate or seek asylum.
50
 
The FBI’s definition uniquely references violations of federal and state law and mentions the 
implications of jurisdiction, clearly reflecting the agency’s law enforcement role. It fails, 
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however, to take into account the potential motivations behind such attacks, or the types of actors 
that employ such attacks. 
Much of the nuance in governmental definitions likely stems from the geopolitical 
consequences of applying the terrorist label, which appears to be made largely based on a 
calculus of political incentives. The Nigerian government, for example, opposed the designation 
of Boko Haram as a terrorist group by the United States State Department, fearing the elevation 
in prestige and legitimacy such a title would confer.
51
 Furthermore, some have suggested that the 
State Department identified “three Basque groups … and … a little known separatist group in 
Xinjiang province” as terrorists in order to secure “Spain’s support for and China’s acquiescence 
in the war in Iraq, respectively.”52  
The United Nations’ Effort to Define Terrorism 
 The quarrelsome nature of labeling has been evident during United Nations efforts to 
coordinate and implement counter-terrorism policies as well. Indeed, UN efforts to reach a 
consensus definition of terrorism can be traced back to the days of its precursor, the League of 
Nations, which in 1937 ultimately chose not to adopt the Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism.
53
 The points of contention in the years since have often surrounded 
“issues of occupation, liberation movements and state-terrorism.”54 In the 1970s, the United 
Nations created the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, but, despite their best efforts, 
not one of the seven proposed definitions was agreeable for all member states.
55
 A consensus 
definition still has not been reached at the time of this paper being written. Despite a lack of 
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 Boko Haram: Inside the State Department debate over the ‘terrorist’ label, The Washington Post, 
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 Bhatia, p.16 (quoting Mariner, Trivializing Terror, 2003) 
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agreement on just what terrorism is, member states have conceded that terrorism is a problem 
worth addressing, and have thus created a number of legal measures to do so. 
 
The International Counter-Terror Regime 
International legal measures designed by the Member States of the United Nations to 
mitigate terrorist activity have existed for decades and can be traced back to an initial 1963 
convention that criminalized dangerous behavior aboard aircraft.
56
 In the 1970s, new UN 
conventions addressed attacks against diplomats
57
 and the taking of hostages
58
, reflecting an 
effort to respond to the evolution of tactics employed by terror groups.
59
 This reactive trend 
continued through the 1990s with the arrival of conventions on maritime safety
60
, plastic 
explosives
61
, and the suppression of terrorist financing
62
, amongst others. These treaties and 
laws, a majority of which were initiated by the General Assembly, gradually normalized 
terrorism as a threat to the security of the international community. Attempts to achieve universal 
ratification and to implement mechanisms that would ensure compliance by all Member States, 
however, were lacking.
63
  
The events of September 11
th
, 2001, triggered a revised approach to countering terrorism 
by the United Nations. Less than three weeks after the attacks, the UN Security Council invoked 
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Chapter VII authority and enacted Resolution 1373, thereby binding all Member States to adhere 
to stringent requirements regarding the conduct of counter-terrorism.
64
 These requirements 
included the suppression of terrorist finances, the denial of safe havens to and the prosecution of 
individuals who facilitate or are involved with terror groups, and an onus to cooperate with 
fellow states in these efforts. The resolution obligated all states to report their progress in 
implementing these stipulations within just ninety days, and urged them to adhere to the existing 
counter-terror legal architecture.”65  
Resolution 1373 not only redefined Member State obligations but also reorganized the 
United Nations’ approach to counter-terrorism, creating a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) 
within the Security Council that is responsible for monitoring the efforts of Member States as 
they work to meet the resolution’s requirements. In 2004, Resolution 1535 created the Counter-
Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) in order to establish a “more permanent staff” as a 
supplement to carry out the CTC’s mission.66 The CTED is comprised of a number of legal and 
subject matter experts whose task is to evaluate the reports submitted by Member States 
regarding their progression in implementing Resolution 1373. The CTED also includes technical 
experts who are able to consult with and provide specialized assistance to Member States 
throughout the implementation processes.
67
 
As of 2012, twenty-three separate bodies of the United Nations were tasked with counter-
terrorism duties
68
, and sixteen relevant international legal instruments had been established.
69
 
These laws and bodies are often referred to collectively as the counter-terror regime and are part 
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of what some scholars view as a regulatory approach by the United Nations towards international 
security.
70
 However, without clear parameters for just what terrorism is, the international 
mandate to aggressively contest it leaves room for abuse. Even the United Nations recognized 
this issue, noting that “calls by the international community to combat terrorism without defining 
the term, can be understood as leaving it to individual States to define what is meant by the term. 
This carries the potential for unintended human rights abuses and even the deliberate misuse of 
the term.”71  
 
Divergent Compliance Despite Widespread Support 
Compliance with the counter-terror regime before 2001 was low,
72
 but over the course of 
the following decade, over “one hundred states ha[d] acceded to or ratified at least ten of [the] 
conventions”73 and every country became a signatory or party to at least one convention in the 
regime,
74
 an improvement the UN characterized as dramatic.
75
  During the 2005 World Summit, 
Member States “condemn[ed] terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by 
whomever, wherever, and for whatever purposes,” agreeing that “it constitutes one of the most 
serious threats to international peace and security.”76 The General Assembly unanimously 
adopted the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy the next year,
77
 which united “all 
192 Member States for the first time behind a common vision … [that] reflected the international 
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community’s resolve to combat the scourge of terrorism”78 and  included  “[a pledge] to consider 
becoming parties to [the legal measures] without delay.”79  Illustrating the international 
community’s continued concern towards counter-terrorism, Member States have reaffirmed their 
commitment on a biannual basis with unanimous resolutions in 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014.
80
 
Despite this widespread support and near-universal recognition of terrorism as a threat to 
international security, actual compliance with the laws making up the counter-terror regime 
continues to be anything but comprehensive. The United Nations suggests that while 
noncompliance may sometimes be attributed to “insufficient will,” it more often is the result of 
insufficient capacity.
81
 In an encouraging show of support, every single Member State submitted 
a report on their implementation progress during the first round.
82
 In the years since, however, 
the submission of reports has dwindled and delays have mounted – a problem exacerbated by a 
UN choice to refrain from making the reports public and thus shaming non-cooperative states.
83
 
Although many countries have fallen short of implementing and cooperating with the counter-
terror regime, many have nevertheless chosen to appropriate the growing international counter-
terror norms for their own purposes, rhetorically seating their own localized issues within them. 
The following section explores this phenomenon in the context of Uganda, which offers a 
desirable case study for two critical reasons. First, the current president, Yoweri Museveni, has 
been in office since January of 1986. Second, throughout his tenure, Museveni has faced off 
against a number of non-state actors, some of which have existed since before the events of 9/11 
and the subsequent war on terror. Uganda thus offers a unique opportunity to examine how the 
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rhetoric of a single administration has evolved between the pre to the post-9/11 periods, using 
actors and groups that have existed for decades as a proxy for rhetorical change. 
 
A Case Study of Museveni’s Uganda 
Museveni’s Rhetoric: The Rise to Power 
 Yoweri Museveni’s use of rhetoric to strategically frame events and further his agenda 
began long before 9/11 and the subsequent global war on terror. In his 1997 autobiography, 
Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda, Museveni 
chronicles his leadership of various political and military organizations between 1971 and 1986 
as he headed efforts to depose Ugandan rulers Idi Amin and Milton Obote from office. After his 
interest in political activism was sparked during his youth, Museveni chose to attend university 
in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, due to its role as a base of operations for regional African liberation 
movements at the time.
84
  His nationalist fervor was nurtured by interactions with fellow 
“freedom-fighter” groups such as the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), who 
were happy to provide weapons, training, and advice to Museveni’s untested group of 
dissidents.
85
 This experience, in conjunction with Museveni’s displeasure with the repressive and 
sectarian nature of the regimes at the time, drove him to launch “a protracted armed struggle for 
liberation” with a goal of eventually establishing the truly democratic Uganda that he 
envisioned.
86
 The details of these early military and political campaigns are not important for this 
discussion and are thus not examined here in depth. What is important, however, is the manner in 
which Museveni framed both his own forces and those in opposition during the campaigns, as it 
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establishes his early affinity for some of the rhetorical strategies that have been described in 
previous sections of this paper.  
Throughout the autobiography, Museveni deliberately classifies the various groups under 
his command with neutral or positively connoted terms - “freedom-fighters,”87  
“revolutionaries,”88 and “guerillas” all appear often in the text.89 The collective actions of these 
groups were described as part of a “people’s war,”90 a “guerilla campaign,”91 a “liberation 
movement,”92 and a “struggle.”93 Though the names of his organizations were regularly altered 
due to newfound alliances, restructuring, or political events, they always were an amalgam of 
positive terms, such as The Front for National Salvation (FRONASA),
94
 the Uganda National 
Liberation Front (UNLF),
95
 and ultimately the National Resistance Movement (NRM).
96
 Even 
the individual battalions within his forces were named after “African heroic figures,” including 
“noted Ugandan opponents of British imperialism in the late 19th century.”97 
 In contrast, pejoratives and negatively connoted terms were used with regularity to 
describe the Amin and Obote regimes. These individuals and their governments as a whole were 
described as “opportunist,”98 “unprincipled,”99 “reactionary,”100 “sectarian,”101   and 
“despicable.”102 Their soldiers were “thugs,”103 “buffoons,”104 “executioners,”105 and “bullies”106 
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who were “incompetent,”107 “illiterate,”108 and “cowardly.”109 Similarly, one of Museveni’s 
stated motivations behind his opposition to the Amin and Obote regimes was that he found their 
leadership to be “ideologically bankrupt.”110 The deliberate effort to dichotomize the political 
situation of the era – Museveni’s brave freedom fighters waging a people’s struggle against 
Amin and Obote’s violent thugs and bullies – is self-evident.  
So too is Museveni’s resistance to being labeled by others. Early on in the campaign, a 
series of events caused the Tanzanian government to withdraw their assistance and to sign the 
1972 Mogadishu Accord, a portion of which established Museveni’s men as “subversive 
forces.”111 Museveni’s writing places the label in quotations, presumably implying his 
disagreement with the use of such terminology. It is also important to note that Museveni was 
clearly aware of how his localized conflict had the potential to be reframed in the wider context 
of the Cold War. Indeed, he complained that groups around him were choosing to align with 
either the West or the East, and argued that “the [Cold War] was reflected in African politics 
because of the … opportunism of the post-independence leaders…”112 Whether deliberate or 
simply the result of intuition, Yoweri Museveni’s early grasp of the political implications behind 
names and labels seems readily apparent.  
Museveni’s Rhetoric: Pre-9/11 
 After a lengthy political and military campaign, Museveni’s forces were ultimately 
successful in removing the Amin and Obote regimes from power, with an end result of Museveni 
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being sworn in as the new president of Uganda in early 1986.
113
 Having often railed against the 
divisive and sectarian policies of previous regimes, Museveni was able to rise to power atop a 
swell of popular support, advocating for an inclusive, “broad-based united front” without 
political parties split along religious or ethnic lines as they had been previously.
114
 The new 
NRM government even went so far as to assimilate a number of guerilla groups that had been 
fighting against Museveni a short time earlier.
115
 President Museveni was described by some in 
the international community as “a new style of African leader to be emulated” for his ability to 
reform the government and improve the provision of healthcare, the military, and the 
economy.
116
  
But as the NRM grew more and more inclusive, Museveni sought to consolidate his own 
power atop it, moving to fill government positions with individuals from his home area in 
western Uganda.
117
 This continued to the point where, “by the mid-1990s it was already clear 
that the NRM had tightened its grip in a way that left little room for meaningful power 
sharing.”118 Tripp argues that soon thereafter, Museveni’s government reached a sort of limbo 
stage, wherein it balanced between democracy and authoritarianism and could be classified as a 
hybrid regime.
119
 Englebert and Dunn provide an excellent description of the nature of such a 
regime: 
 They hold regular elections, but these are often manipulated to the benefit of the 
 incumbents; they provide some civil and political liberties, yet more or less frequently  
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 repress their exercise; they are not hegemonic, as they contain spheres of public life  
 where opposition can organize and express itself, including the media, civil society, 
 and legislatures, yet these groups lack autonomy and face considerable difficulties 
 in asserting themselves; although not as easily repressed as in pure authoritarian  
 regimes, their members remain more vulnerable than in democracies;… the security 
 apparatus operates with few institutional and legal constraints and is often focused 
 on domestic opponents…”120 
 As the NRA government swung back towards less inclusivity and its legitimacy dwindled 
as a result, Museveni’s behavior began to evoke the hallmarks of a hybrid regime. His strategy to 
consolidate power and secure his place in office increasingly involved the deployment of the 
state security apparatus in a campaign to deliberately harass and repress political rivals.
121
  
In addition to Museveni’s perceived insecurity at the hands of political competition, 
Uganda faced undeniable threats from as many as 22 rebellious groups operating within its 
territory after the NRM assumed power.
122
 Two remained active after 9/11 had occurred, and 
thus only they will be included in this study. A brief overview of each follows. 
 
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
 As Museveni’s NRM rose to power in 1986, members of the northern Ugandan Acholi 
ethnic group were driven by abuses at the hands of the new government into creating the Holy 
Spirit Movement, an armed resistance organization.
123
 Though quickly stamped out, the 
movement’s spiritual character lived on through Joseph Kony who claimed it as his own and 
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created the Lord’s Resistance Army in order to continue the fight against the NRM.124The LRA 
quickly became notorious for its brutal treatment of civilian populations, employing executions, 
torture, and the mass kidnapping of hundreds of children on a regular basis.
125
 The LRA last 
conducted attacks in Uganda in 2006 and now roam between the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
South Sudan, and the Central African Republic, evading regional government forces and 
pillaging those they come across.
126
 
The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 
 The ADF was formed by Ugandan Muslims who also felt marginalized by the new NRA 
government.
127
 Operating from western Uganda and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
supported by allies in neighboring Sudan, the ADF began their strikes in 1996, targeting both 
Ugandan military forces as well as civilians.
128
 Attacks generally took place in western districts 
of Uganda but occasionally occurred in Kampala, the capital, with deaths ranging anywhere from 
five to fifty per incident on a regular basis.
129
 ADF activity peaked with 1998 grenade attacks in 
Kampala
130
, but by 1999 it was on the verge of destruction.
131
 The group has experienced a 
resurgence in activity in recent years.
132
 
 
 Museveni’s autobiography mentions that “after [the end of the war] there was peace in 
the whole of the northern region until the bandits started their activities.”133 He goes on to 
describe efforts made to stamp out the security issues posed by groups in Uganda’s peripheral 
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areas, noting that the NRM had “been engaged in battling against one criminal group after 
another” since taking power.134 His writing focusing almost entirely on the LRA, however, and 
refers to the group as “bandits,”135 an “insurgency,”136 a “rebellion,”137 “lawlessness,”138and 
“criminals.”139 He seemed well aware of the LRA’s pattern of heinous attacks, referring to their 
treatment of civilians as “atrocities”140 and even going on to say that “what Kony’s bandits are 
doing is not only a crime against the state: it is a crime against the population… These are crimes 
against humanity on a massive scale. I find it completely distasteful that people do not with one 
voice condemn these crimes of Kony and his bandits.”141 Despite such invectives, at no time 
does Museveni refer to the LRA (or any others) as a terrorist group in his autobiography.  
 An analysis of statements by Ugandan delegates to the United Nations between 1986 and 
2001 yields similar results. These individuals participated in discussions regarding terrorism on a 
regular basis but focused on broadly countering the phenomenon internationally and rarely 
referred to specific actors or events. For example, throughout the 1990s, delegates voiced their 
concern about potential links between terrorist groups and drug traffickers as well as the 
potential for these groups to acquire a weapon of mass destruction.
142
 Other discussions were 
dedicated to future international cooperation on these issues as well as Uganda’s willingness to 
explore future adoption of UN legal instruments on terrorism. Statements that did make 
references to particular groups or actors still predominately used terms like rebels or criminals. 
During a 1999 Security Council discussion regarding instability in the Democratic Republic of 
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the Congo, Ugandan Minister for Foreign Affairs Amama Mbabazi referred to the Allied 
Democratic Forces as a “rebel group” and a “criminal element.”143 That same year, Minister 
Mbabazi reiterated to the General Assembly that the ADF was a rebel group and the LRA was a 
“criminal gang.”144 A 1996 statement mentions concern about “renegade groups” in northern 
Uganda that have committed “terrorist acts” on the citizenry,145 but no organizations in particular 
were attributed as terrorists. Similarly, in 2000, Ugandan delegates argued that Sudan was 
playing a “terrorist role” in supporting various non-state actors, but the forces operating in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo were still referred to as “opposition groups.”146 Even as late 
as May of 2001, such groups in the DRC were labeled rebels.
147
 
Use of the term terrorist in the context of a particular individual or group was rare. A 
majority of such usages took place during the 1998 General Assembly General Debate which 
convened shortly after the bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, both 
Ugandan neighbors. It is reasonable to presume that these strikes resulted in a heightened 
salience of terrorism for countries in the region and, perhaps as a result, the Ugandan delegates 
made increased references to it that year. These references included a response to accusations by 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo that Uganda had violated their sovereignty: Uganda 
replied that the purpose was to “contain and eventually remove bandits and terrorists who have 
been… destabilizing Uganda.”148 Delegates also described the LRA as a terrorist group149 and, 
during remarks about the East African embassy attacks, asserted that “Uganda, too, suffered 
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terrorist attacks in which three civilian public buses were bombed…”150 Nevertheless, these 
incidents appear to be anomalies, as usage of other terms such as rebel had returned by the next 
year.
151
 Furthermore, in 2000, Uganda stated that the “two [security] issues of greatest concern to 
us … are … the issues of small arms and light weapons and of anti-personnel landmines.”152 On 
the eve of 9/11, the language of Ugandan politicians did not suggest particularly strong concerns 
about terrorists or terrorism domestically. 
Museveni’s Rhetoric: Post-9/11  
By early 2001, an election year, Museveni’s NRM government had maintained and even 
escalated the repressive targeting of political opposition members.
153
 Museveni’s primary 
competition in that year’s presidential race was Kizza Besigye, the head of a group known as the 
Reform Agenda.
154
 In an effort to undermine the group’s legitimacy, the NRM associated the 
Reform Agenda with “rebel organizations … [which] provided a pretext for harassment directed 
at them.”155 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror would soon provide the NRM government 
with a far more effective rhetorical tool for delegitimizing political opponents.  
Indeed, the Museveni regime moved quickly to appropriate such rhetoric and to take 
advantage of the changing international security norms that manifested late in 2001. In October, 
while attending an African counter-terrorism conference in Senegal, President Museveni began 
to lay the groundwork, remarking that terrorism was not just a problem for the United States but 
one for Africa as well.
156
 That same month, a Ugandan UN delegate paid his respects to the 
United States and then launched into Uganda’s fifteen year history fighting domestic terrorists 
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like the LRA and ADF.
157
 In November, President Museveni too pledged his support for the 
United States and “the coalition against terrorism” in a speech to the United Nations.158 Shortly 
thereafter, Ugandan delegates presented the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee with 
an initial report detailing the steps they had taken domestically in order to adhere to the 
requirements of Resolution 1373. In the report, Uganda again situated itself as a long-time victim 
of terrorism, citing attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Allied Democratic Forces as 
early as 1988 and 1994, respectively.
159
 The report theorizes that the 1998 U.S. embassy 
bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi also targeted Kampala, and asserts that the LRA and 
ADF were linked with al-Qaeda.
160
 Ugandan delegates to the UN continued to reiterate this 
narrative throughout the 2000s, often referring to both the LRA and ADF as enduring and 
notorious terrorist groups.
161
 Even Minister of Defence [sic] Mbabazi
162
 suggested that the LRA 
and ADF not only had terrorized Uganda for an extended period of time but that the ADF had 
been trained by Al-Qaida with plans to work together in the future.
163
 Puzzlingly, none of this 
information had been mentioned just two years before when Mbabazo referred to the same 
groups as criminals and rebels. These revisionist claims are indicative of the concerted effort to 
reframe Ugandan security challenges in an effort to situate the country on the front line alongside 
the United States against terrorism. 
Domestically the Museveni regime began to capitalize on the international 
counterterrorism mandate. In June of 2002, Uganda passed The Anti-Terrorism Act, which was 
touted as “clear testimony to the commitment of the Government of Uganda to fight 
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terrorism.”164 The Act criminalized a wide range of terrorism-related activities, targeting 
“persons who plan, instigate, support, finance or execute acts of terrorism” or those who are 
members or supporters of such groups.
165
 The legislation also included a list of three identified 
(by the NRM) terrorist organizations within Uganda: The Lord’s Resistance Army (and the 
Lord’s Resistance Movement, another name for the group), the Allied Democratic Forces, and 
al-Qaeda,
166
 conveniently providing President Museveni with a reason to expand his security 
apparatus. 
After the passage of the Act, paramilitary security forces not only grew in numbers but 
also were utilized on a more common basis.
167
 Tripp noted that by 2002 the political violence 
had shifted from “spontaneous eruptions of fighting” to “highly planned and organized” 
attacks.
168
 One such unit was the newly created Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATT), tasked 
with the coordination of all counter-terror operations within Uganda.
169
 JATT and those under its 
purview have developed into a valuable tool of political intimidation and repression for 
Museveni’s regime, and abuses by these units have been well-documented. In years past, JATT 
has been responsible for the secret detainment of a number of individuals allegedly suspected of 
terrorism but not formally charged with any crimes.
170
 Human Rights Watch released a ninety-
page report in 2009 documenting systematic abuse of civilians by JATT members who were 
                                                 
164
 A/57/PV.16 (2002) 
165
 Ugandan Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 
166
 Ibid 
167
 Tripp, p. 136 
168
 Ibid, pp. 93-94 
169
 Ugandan Third report to the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (2005), S/2005/193 
170
 Uganda: Charge or Release People Secretly Detained, Human Rights Watch, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/17/uganda-charge-or-release-people-secretly-detained 
32 
 
ostensibly carrying out counter-terror operations, bolstering further these accusations.
171
 Similar 
concerns have been echoed in a number of other reports.
172
   
Longtime Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni has found domestic counter-terror 
legislation to be particularly useful during election season as well, “labeling as a terrorist the 
main opposition candidate in two recent presidential elections.”173 Because the Ugandan media 
was also significantly impacted by the Anti-Terrorism Act, which reserves the right to shut down 
radio stations who host terrorists,
174
 the law was able to be used to block perennial opposition 
candidate Kizza Besigye’s access to the airwaves in 2006.175 Numerous reports by Freedom 
House corroborate these concerns, noting that the ATA was a particularly worrying piece of 
legislation for this reason.
176
 Upon his return from exile for the 2006 elections, Besigye was also 
arrested and charged with terrorism for alleged links to the LRA.
177
 In response to criticism that 
the 2006 elections may have been rigged, Museveni stated that “this coalition of bad forces 
[referring to the opposition] is not acceptable to us. Those who hobnob with terrorism, they 
spend all of their time attacking the movement which is fighting those very evils.”178 Museveni 
went on to again “publicly accuse Besigye of being a terrorist and threatened to capture or kill all 
terrorists.”179 
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The Ugandan government doesn’t appear likely to change their approach any time soon. 
In fact, they may have grown even bolder - at a 2014 United Nations Security Council meeting 
on terrorism and the threat it presents to international peace and security, a Ugandan 
representative argued that the African continent had long suffered from terrorism in the form of 
the transatlantic and trans-Saharan slave trades.
180 
The same Ugandan delegate went on to 
reiterate that the Allied Democratic Front, which had resurged in the late 2000s, was similar to 
al-Qaeda and, newly, al-Shabaab.
181
 Domestically, the Ugandan police banned gatherings of over 
five people in public without approval from the Inspector General of Police in 2010, ostensibly 
to reduce targets for would-be terrorists.
182
 In practice, the law seems designed to stifle political 
demonstrations – indeed, in 2015 it was used to arrest none other than Kizza Besigye and another 
opposition politician.
183
 Ugandan law enforcement bodies were also recently exploring possible 
legislation that would provide the Inspector General of the Police “the power to seize funds and 
property linked or intended for terrorism activities.”184 In a 2015 statement, Museveni 
maintained the assertion that “the terrorism threat by extremist forces is one of the most urgent 
problems facing our region.”185 It would appear that such counter-terrorism rhetoric will 
continue to be a valuable tool for the Museveni regime for the duration of his time in office.  
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Conclusion 
 The phenomenon of rhetorically appropriating the war on terror is, of course, not 
endemic to Uganda - it has been employed elsewhere across sub-Saharan Africa and beyond. 
Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, for example, has been cited by human rights groups for 
committing similar acts against political and social outgroups.
186
 In Ethiopia, journalists critical 
of the state have been imprisoned under suspicion of working with terrorist networks, including 
the winner of the UNESCO / Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize in 2013.
187
 
Representatives of the Ethiopian state argued that the journalist wasn’t “accused for their 
writings … it is because they were guilty of working with terrorists.”188 Similarly, a new law in 
Egypt would make contradicting “the official version of events in terrorism-related cases a 
crime.”189  
As this trend has grown, a number of academics have identified the tendency of 
statesmen to reframe their domestic issues in the context of the war on terror. These assertions 
are typically only made in passing, often attributing the chief motivations behind rhetorical shifts 
to nothing more than efforts to lure financial and military benefits from the West.
190
 Indeed, 
Uganda has been a strong counterterrorism partner for the United States since 2001. President 
Museveni has participated in a number of regional counterterror initiatives, and Ugandan troops 
represent a majority amongst the African Union forces deployed in Somalia.
191
 A 2010 Time 
                                                 
186
 Kenya: Killings, Disappearances by Anti-Terror Police, Human Rights Watch 2014, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/18/kenya-killings-disappearances-anti-terror-police 
187
 Journalism Is Not a Crime: Violations of Media Freedoms in Ethiopia, Human Rights Watch 2015, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2015/01/21/journalism-not-crime 
188
 Ibid 
189
 New terrorism law could target journalists in Egypt, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/05/africa/egypt-terrorism-law-
journalists/index.html  
190
 See: Is Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza playing the terror card? BBC, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32829183; Bhatia, p. 13; Tripp, p. 171, Whitaker, p. 653 
191
 US Military Involvement in Uganda Yields Mixed Results, Voice of America, 2012, 
http://www.voanews.com/content/us-military-involvement-in-uganda-yields-mixed-results/1453697.html 
35 
 
article suggested that Museveni’s cooperation in countering al-Shabaab renders him a valuable 
ally in the region and undermines criticism that otherwise may have been made about lack of 
democratic reforms in Uganda.
192
  But Whitaker has found that the states most compliant with 
the new counterterror regime “did not receive significantly larger aid increases between 2000 
and 2005 … than their counterparts” who were less compliant.193 She goes on to note that the 
states who “received the largest proportional increases in US military assistance… suggest 
decisions based on a range of strategic and other considerations.
194
 It would appear instead that 
the rhetorical shift employed by the Museveni regime after 9/11 was motivated primarily by the 
power that labels have to delegitimize others and their causes, an especially useful tool for a 
perennial president with a need to stifle political opposition. Future research on the presence or 
absence of rhetorical shifts within full autocracies and or democracies may be able to yield 
fruitful insight on the factors that incentivize and limit the use of such linguistic facades.  
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